Tractarian Objects Cannot Be Properties and Relations :: Philosophy Papers

Tractarian Objects Cannot Be Properties and Relations One of the most frequently discussed notions in Wittgenstein’s Tractatus is the notion of simple object. However, among the literature on Tractarian objects, recent or classic, none has treated configurations of objects as a major and non-trivial issue. In this paper, I show that a detailed study of configurations of objects will yield a series of interesting and important results: it leads to a new understanding of the picture theory, helps us calculate the maximum numbers of internal and external properties of objects, and enables us to reinterpret and reach a solution to the notorious debate on whether properties and relations should be included as Tractarian objects. In this paper I reinterpret and offer a solution to one of the most famous debates in Wittgenstein's early philosophy: the debate whether the Tractarian objects include properties and relations (hereinafter 'PRO' for the thesis that properties and relations are Tractarian objects, 'PRO debate' for the debate whether properties and relations are Tractarian objects, and 'PRO issue' for the issue whether properties and relations are Tractarian objects). Since the very beginning, PRO debate has been equated with the debate whether objects include universals in many secondary literatures. However, it seems to me that these two debates are not exactly the same thing, for the following reasons: PRO debate is in fact a debate concerning whether properties and relations are objects or "modes of configurations of objects" (hereinafter 'MCOs'), insofar as object and MCO are two distinct and exhaustive types of components of states of affairs. Since the essential difference between objects and MCOs is that objects can be the subject matter of states of affairs while MCOs cannot, PRO debate is essentially a debate concerning the logical status of properties and relations, i.e., whether properties and relations can be the subject matter of states of affairs. However, the debate whether objects include universals is a debate concerning the metaphysical nature of objects, i.e., whether some objects can have multiple instances at the same time. T he two debates are clearly not logically equivalent, for on the one hand, we can hold that properties and relations cannot be the subject matter of states of affairs, and yet insist that the Tractarian objects be abstract entities, e.g., Platonic forms; on the other, we can hold that properties and relations are also what states of affairs are about, and yet claim that they are nominalized properties and relations, and moreover, all of the Tractarian objects are particulars, e.